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Abstract—A novel method and protocol establishing common
secrecy based on physical parameters between two users is
proposed. The four physical parameters of users are their clock
frequencies, their relative clock phases and the distance between
them. The protocol proposed between two users is backed by
theoretical model for the measurements. Further, estimators
are proposed to estimate secret physical parameters. Physically
exchanged parameters are shown to be secure by virtue of
their non-observability to adversaries. Under a simplified analysis
based on a testbed settings, it is shown that 38 bits of common
secrecy can be derived for one run of the proposed protocol
among users. The method proposed is also robust against
various kinds of active timing attacks and active impersonating
adversaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clocks are everywhere. They are found in every gadget
around us. Various operations across the digital system are
synchronized at clock edges. Crystal clocks are used in most
consumer electronics present in our surroundings as heart beats
of electronic systems. This motivates usage of physical charac-
teristics of clocks in security applications and has the potential
to provide security to far reaches of electronic presence.
Ever present electronics with clocks is synonymous to
internet-of-things (IOT) context. With increasing potential of
IOT applications, security of data exchange in IOT applica-
tions also is of paramount importance [1], [2]. The IOT context
puts more stringent constraints on resource consumption for
achieving secrecy. Low complexity schemes for key generation
is proposed in [3] As suggested in [4], physical layer security
can play an important role in IOT applications by alleviating
the need for high computation required in traditional cryp-
tography by making use of existing radio functionality to
support security. In [5], involvement of control and physical
layer of a system for security of cyber physical system (CPS)
is suggested. In physical layer security, encrypting messages
using secret keys generated based on wireless channel is the
most investigated method [4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12]. In an Alice, Bob and Eve setup as shown in Fig.1,
secret key generation has been based on the uniqueness of
channel between Alice and Bob than Alice-Eve or Bob-
Eve channel. Most of above wireless based key generation
methods rely on randomness of channel to produce a unique
key between Alice and Bob. However, such schemes suffer
from many weaknesses as discussed in [4]. Assumptions such
as Gaussian symmetric channel, dynamic requirement of the
channel, weak adversary models etc. are shown to be weak
on many instances. Many other practical implementation and
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Fig. 1: Alice, Bob and Eve setup. Alice and Bob separated
by distance ρAB exchange physical parameters over wireless to
generate a shared secret key. Eve who is ρAE distance away
from Alice and ρBE away from Bob, is an adversary listening
to the wireless exchanges. She is attempting to decipher the
parameters from measurements.
usage issues in implementing wireless channel based physical
layer security are discussed in [10], [4].
A few other physical parameters are proposed for gen-
erating secret keys over wireless. They are received signal
strength (RSS), drifting oscillators, distance between nodes,
radiometric signatures, quantum key generation etc [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. In [13], exhaustive review on key
generation from physical parameters are written. Various ways
of non-cryptographic authentication are described. In [15],
effectiveness of RSS for secret key generation between two
nodes is experimentally analysed and in absence of a highly
dynamic environment, low entropy bits are generated for secret
keys. The randomness of a physical clock parameter, i.e., its
oscillating frequency has been suggested a few times [20],
[21], [22]. A carrier frequency tracking framework and sub-
sequent device authentication based on it is proposed in [20].
Whereas, a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) device authenti-
cation based on carrier frequencies from all the transmitters is
proposed in [22]. The papers suggesting oscillator properties
for secure exchanges are mostly based on authenticating
nodes by their signature oscillator characteristics. These papers
mostly describe the system to the extent of proving uniqueness
of absolute or relative oscillator characteristics, while having
a weak or no adversary model assumptions. Security in clock
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2synchronization schemes has also been discussed [23], [24].
Usage of clock synchronization to detect man-in-the-middle
attack is discussed in [25]. Fundamental limits on security
using clock synchronization is proposed along with clock
synchronization protocol for security purposes. Among other
contexts of physical layer security, physical layer security
in sensor networks based on distributed detection have been
recently discussed in [3], [26].
Usage of distance and position for securing communication
has often been discussed [13], [14], [15], [27], [28], [29],
[30]. Usage of distance between nodes implicitly appears in
RSS based authentication and secure key generation methods
[13], [14], [15]. Whereas, explicit application of distance for
security appears in concepts such as distance bounding pro-
tocols and their use in concepts such as secure neighbourhod
discovery [18], [28], [29], [31], [32], [33].
Vulnerability to active adversaries has been a very critical
issue in secure communications and key exchanges [34], [35],
[36], [37], [27]. There is limited discussion on active adversary
in physical layer context as pointed out in [34]. In this
paper usage of the proposed method in warding off adversary
attack is also suggested. Various active adversary models are
suggested in [27] which are very relevant to this work and
considered in subsequent sections of the paper.
The main motivation of this paper is proposing a secure
mechanism to exchange physical parameters of users among
them over wireless. Accordingly, the main idea proposed in
this paper is a protocol which helps in secret exchange of
physical parameters between two nodes. The proposed proto-
col and the measurements based on the protocol lets two nodes
exchange their relative physical parameters. The protocol
incorporates actions at two nodes to strengthen the robustness
of parameter exchange against any passive eavesdropper and
to some extent to an active adversary, as explained later in the
paper. The protocol exploits a physical phenomena between
two continuous running clocks separated by a distance for
parameter exchange while providing secrecy.
Any two physical clocks can have a frequency and a
phase relation. The frequency relation considered here is the
difference in frequency (fd) between the clocks and the phase
relation (φ) is the relative phase of the clocks. If these clocks
are mounted on two separate devices then the distance between
these user (ρ) provides another physical dimension to use.
Further in the paper, a set of four independent parameters
i.e., two clock frequencies of users derived from difference
frequencies, their relative phase and the distance between
them are shown to be exchanged as shared secret parameters
between two users. The idea presented in this paper is outcome
of experiments with impulse radio ultrawideband (IR-UWB)
testbed [38], [39] that manifests practical relevance of the
work.
In this paper IR-UWB signals are suggested to be used for
signalling among Alice and Bob in Fig.1. Alice periodically
sends PING signals to Bob and after a delay Bob sends a
RESPOND signal. The nodes Alice and Bob exchange impulse
signals PING and RESPOND triggered by time events generated
using an oscillator or a clock. Hence the mechanism or the
protocol of signal exchange will be called as CLocked IMpulse
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Fig. 2: Conceptual timing diagram of one-way RTT protocol
between Alice and Bob. Alice transmits PING at interval Tm
seconds and collects measurements [yA(1) yA(2) · · · ]>. Bob is
a distance ρAB away from Alice and sends RESPOND after a
delay δB from the instance it receives the PING from Alice.
EXchange (CLIMEX). Further discussions in the paper is
based on classical Alice, Bob and Eve setup [7], [8].
The main contributions of the paper are:
1) The CLIMEX protocol between two nodes to exchange
physical parameters of two nodes discreetly over wireless.
2) A mathematical model for the measurements at nodes.
3) Estimators for estimating required parameters at nodes
from the collected measurements.
4) A simplified analysis to evaluate number of possible
secret bits which can be derived from epochs of mea-
surements. Secret bits derived can be further used for
encryption and authentication.
5) Evaluation in presence of passive adversary. Different
possible measurements by passive adversary are consid-
ered in this paper.
6) Discussing robustness against a few types of active ad-
versaries. Particularly, against timing attacks and imper-
sonating adversary.
In summary, we propose analyse and provide experimental
observations for CLIMEX as a tool for secure exchange of
physical parameters.
This paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the
principle of operation, gives an overview of measurements,
describes the basic phenomenon to be used and introduces
the CLIMEX protocol while comparing it with the basic RTT
protocol. Section II describes the basic scheme and compares
the proposed CLIMEX protocol with basic RTT protocol. Next
described are measurement models for the protocols in section
III. Estimators based on measurement models are presented
in IV. Following estimators is the section V-B on adversary
models which discusses possible measurements adversary can
do. Section V has analyzed the security aspects proposed in
this paper. It is followed by further discussion on practicality
and possible future work on the proposed idea in section VI.
The last section then is the conclusion.
II. PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION
The principle of parameter exchange among nodes proposed
in this paper is based on round trip time (RTT) measurements.
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Fig. 3: Interplay between two clocks giving rise to sawtooth measurements at the measuring end.
One-way RTT is shown in the Fig.2. Alice sends ’PING’
signals to Bob at regular interval of Tm seconds. Bob responds
after a delay δB and does not collect any measurement. The
delay δB is generated at Bob’s end using its own clock with
frequency fB. Alice collects an epoch of RTT measurements,
[yA(1) yA(2) · · · ]>. These measurements are collected using a
precise time difference measurement device which usually has
time measurement precision much higher than clock periods
of the clocks in discussion. For very clock frequencies (MHz
or greater) in consideration, typically the precision is in
range of nano to pico seconds. One such device is time to
digital converter (TDC) [40], [41]. Usage of such measurement
precision is also customary in network time synchronization
schemes like precision time protocol (PTP) [42], [43]. It is
followed by Bob also collecting an epoch of measurements
[yB(1) yB(2) · · · ]> by sending several ’PINGs’ and measuring
RTT where Alice introduces delay δA using its clock with
frequency fB.
From their wireless signal exchanges and RTT measure-
ments, Alice and Bob can estimate a few relative parameters
among them. They can estimate their relative clock frequency
fd = fA − fB, relative phase of their clocks, φtest and the
parameter ρAB, the distance between Alice and Bob [38], [39].
The first measurements at Alice in the sequence of measure-
ments is timestampped with time t
′
. The phase of the signal in
the measurement depends on the instance of the measurement
collection. It is assumed that the physical parameters to be
exchanged remain time invariant during this period when Alice
and Bob collect their respective measurements.
A. Interplay between two clocks
As shown in Fig.3, Alice and Bob periodically exchange
PINGS and corresponding RESPONDS. Figure 3 illustrates
generation of sawtooth waveform as a result of interplay
between clocks of Alice and Bob through RTT measurements
among them. Alice’s clock has period TA = 1/fA and Bob’s
clock has period TB = 1/fB. Alice sends successive PINGS at
regular interval, Tm = 4TA in the illustration. Bob RESPONDS
after introducing a delay of one clock period TB from the
clock edge subsequent to arrival of signal from Alice. As
illustrated form the figure, at instance 3, Bob receives PING
from Alice just after a clock edge has elapsed, which results
in largest RTT measurement at Alice. Whereas, at instance 4,
Bob receives the PING nearly at the same time a clock edge
arrives. Hence, the RTT at Alice is the smallest. The frequency
of sawtooth waveform is the difference frequency fd. The
height of the sawtooth measurement equals TB. The phase of
both clocks are related to the phase of the sawtooth waveform
which is a function of t
′
, instance when the measurement
begins. Generation of sawtooth from RTT measurements was
first reported in [39]. The above protocol of signal exchange
between Alice and Bob is RTT protocol. CLIMEX protocol
with a few changes in RTT protocol is introduced next.
B. RTT protocol and the CLIMEX protocol
RTT measurements where events are initiated by clock
edges at both the ends are shown in Fig.4. The figure has
clock tick level detail of RTT measurements shown in Fig.2.
Figure 4a is the RTT protocol resulting in sawtooth RTT
measurements and Fig.4b is the CLIMEX protocol. RTT and
CLIMEX protocols are explained now.
1) The upside arrows in the Figs. 4a and 4b are the clock
edges(ticks) of Alice’s and Bob’s clocks. As in the Fig.4a,
PING and RESPOND events are generated on clock edges.
2) Alice transmits PING signals periodically every Tm sec-
onds. Alice counts this period using its clock with clock
period TA. In the CLIMEX protocol of Fig. 4b, instead
of transmitting PING at clock edge, Alice transmits after
a random delay ∆1 from the clock edge. The added
random delay is known only to the Alice. It provides
secure exchange of keys by dithering RTT measurements
as explained later in III-B.
3) Bob receives the PING after a path delay of ρAB/c
seconds, c is speed of light. In the RTT protocol of Fig.4a,
Bob responds to Alice’s ping after a nominal wait, δ0, of
two clock periods. The total delay at Bob’s end would be
δB(1). In the CLIMEX protocol, Bob responds to Alice’s
PING after a scaled delay of δ¯B(1) seconds as shown in
Fig.4b. The scaled delay δ¯B will be explained in III-B.
4) Alice receives Bob’s RESPOND and measures RTT yA(1)
as shown in Figs. 4a and 4b.
5) Alice collects an epoch of N RTT measurements. Mea-
surements are timestampped by time measurement begin-
ning, t′. yA|t′ = [yA(1) · · · yA(N)]> ∈ RN .
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(b) The CLIMEX Protocol.
Fig. 4: The RTT protocol and the CLIMEX protocol. In
addition to the RTT protocol, the CLIMEX protocol has
random transmission delays ∆1, ∆2 introduced by Alice and
scaled delay δ¯B(1) at Bob’s end.
6) After Alice, Bob collects his measurements in a similar
way as Alice. Bob’s epoch of measurements is yB|t′′ =
[yB(1) · · · yB(N)]> ∈ RN which is timestampped by t′′.
As evident from the above discussion that the main differences
between the RTT protocol and the CLIMEX protocol are
addition of random delay ∆i to PINGs by Alice and the scaled
RESPOND δ¯B by Bob. In the next section it will be shown
that the proposed changes to the CLIMEX protocol over RTT
protocol gives rise to a measurement model which helps in
establishing common secrecy between Alice and Bob.
III. MEASUREMENT MODEL
In this section, measurement model of RTT protocol as
shown in Fig.4a and CLIMEX protocol as shown in Fig.4b
is suggested. As subsequently shown, both the measurement
model is nonlinear in parameters of interest and model of
CLIMEX protocol provides useful features for secure ex-
changes of parameters.
A. Measurement model for an epoch collection by Alice one-
way in RTT protocol
RTT measurement epoch recorded by Alice is yA|t′ =
[yA(1) · · · yA(N)]> ∈ RN . It can be written compactly in
vector form as
yA|t′ = δB + 2ρAB
c
1 + w , (1)
where δB is the total delay vector at Bob’s node
δB = h(fd, TB, φ
′
,n) + δ01. (2)
The function h(fd, TB, φ
′
,n) = [h(1) · · · h(N)]> results in
sawtooth shape in measurements and can be given by
h(fd, TB, φ
′
,n) , modTB
(
TB
2pi
mod2pi(2pifdt + φ
′
1) + n
)
. (3)
The time vector t = [t′ t′+Tm t′+2Tm · · · t′+(N−1)Tm]>.
φ
′
is the relative phase of Alice’s and Bob’s clock when the
measurement has timestamp t′ with first measurement yA(1).
Similarly, φ
′′
is the phase of sawtooth where the measurement
epoch is collected by Bob. The noise vectors n and w are
explained in detail in the subsection III-C.
There are two modulus terms in (6). The internal modulus is
with respect to 2pi radians which corresponds to one period of
the sawtooth waveform [39]. The outer modulus is taken with
respect to TB. The outer modulus was not considered before
as σ2j and σ
2
c were assumed small [39]. The model with only
internal modulus was accurate enough to estimate parameters
of interest with sufficient accuracy from the experimental data.
However, in the current paper, random delays (∆i) are added
to the argument of the outer modulus. Hence the outer modulus
comes into picture. Explanation for outer modulus is seen from
Fig.5a which is a phasor diagram for argument of the sawtooth
measurement. A noise term nj can move a phasor from one
quadrant to another. Such transitions of moving a signal to the
first quadrant results in nonlinear jumps in sawtooth waveform
at discontinuities, as shown in Fig.5a. Also shown in the figure
are effect of the phasor jump on RTT measurements. ’RTT
noiseless’ is RTT without any noise. Whereas, ’RTT with
noise’ is the RTT measurement when noise appears at phase
discontinuity of sawtooth waveform. The sawtooth waveforms
at Alice for two cases depending on the sign of fd is shown in
Fig.5b and Fig.5c. In Fig.5b, Alice’s clock frequency is larger
than Bob and in 5c, it is smaller. The characteristic sawtooth
waveform provides a valid signature to message exchange
between Alice and Bob as discussed later.
B. Measurement model for an epoch collection by Alice in
CLIMEX protocol
RTT measurements recorded by Alice after running
CLIMEX protocol with Bob as shown in Fig.4b can be written
yA|t′ = δ¯B + 2ρAB
c
1 + w , (4)
where δ¯B is the total delay vector at Bob’s node,
δ¯B = g(fd, A, φ
′
,∆,n) + δ01. (5)
5nj
RTT with noise
RTT noiseless
fA < fB
fA > fB
ωd = 2πfd + φ
nj
(a) Phasor for sawtooth measurements. Shows noise effect in jumping
quadrant leading to zero crossings.
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(b) Measurements at Alice/Bob, Sawtooth has positive
slope as fA is larger than fB, for fd = fA − fB.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1.866
1.868
1.87
1.872
1.874
1.876
1.878
1.88 x 10
−6
(c) Measurements at Bob/Alice, Sawtooth has negative
slope as fA is smaller than fB, for fd = fA − fB.
Fig. 5: Details of measurement protocol, phasor argument of
the sawtooth function and effect of noise.
The function g(fd, A, φ
′
,n) = [g(1) · · · g(N)]> re-
sults in sawtooth shape in measurements. The function
g(fd, TB, φ
′
,∆,n) in this case is
g(fd, A, φ
′
,∆,n)
, A
TB
modTB
(
TB
2pimod2pi(2pifdt + φ
′
1) + ∆ + n
)
. (6)
In (6), ∆ is the random delay vector, ∆ = [∆1,∆2, ...,∆N ]>.
Delay ∆1 shown in Fig.4b is known only to Alice and can be
assigned any distribution in order to increase estimation error
of parameters at Eve. Figure 6 shows RTT measurements at
Alice when random transmission delay uniformly distributed
between is 0 and TA are added while sending PINGs. The figure
shows the dithering effect delays ∆ have on RTT measure-
ments. Figure 6a corresponds to measurements with no random
delay added to PINGS and the measurement has the sawtooth
waveform. In subsequent figures 6b, 6c, 6d and 6e increasing
variance of the added random delay increasingly distorts the
measurement waveforms. Alice can estimate the shared secret
parameters these measurements with the knowledge of ∆ as
will be discussed in next section while discussing estimators
for these parameters. Whereas, the adversary Eve can not infer
parameters from these measurements without the knowledge
of delays ∆.
As it can be seen from (3), the outer modulus with respect
to TB will have a peak-to-peak magnitude of TB. The height of
the sawtooth reveals information on Bob’s clock period in such
measurements. As can be seen further in the discussion from
(14) that Eve can estimate parameters of sawtooth from TDOA
measurements while eavesdropping. Thus an eavesdropper to
the RTT measurements can estimate Bob’s clock period TB,
hence clock frequency fB. To avoid this, as explained in
section II-B, time scaling of the delay by Bob is proposed
before sending RESPOND. As shown in the Fig.7, delay δB
with maximum value TB seconds is scaled to a delay δ¯B with
maximum value A seconds.
δ¯B = δB
A+ δ0
TB + δ0
. (7)
A is known to all. As shown in Fig.4b, Bob measures g(1)
and computes δB = g(1) + δ0. Further, Bob computes δ¯B from
(7) and advances or delays transmitting RESPOND by δB ±
δ¯B seconds. In the shown examples of Fig.4b and Fig.7, A
is shown smaller than TB. Hence Bob is shown advancing
the time of RESPOND transmission. With scaled RESPOND,
the sawtooth function (3) in RTT protocol transforms with a
multiplicative factor ATB as (6) in the CLIMEX protocol. As
a result, peak-to-peak amplitude of the sawtooth in CLIMEX
protocol is a known to all value A.
C. The noise model
There are two sources of noise in CLIMEX protocol. One
is jitter noise in clock edges of Alice and Bob with assumed
distribution N (0, σ2j ) and another is channel noise from wire-
less transmission with distribution N (0, σ2c ). In measurement
models, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6), the noise vector n
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(a) ∆ ∼ U(0, 0)
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(c) ∆ ∼ U(0, 0.5TA)
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(d) ∆ ∼ U(0, 0.75TA)
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Fig. 6: RTT Measurements as a result of added random PING delays ∆. As illustrated in the figure, increasing standard
deviation of ∆ increases dithering of measurements. ∆ is known only to the node transmitting PINGS. Any other node doing
measurements will not be able to infer any information from it, due to lack of any information about ∆.
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Fig. 7: Delay scaling at responding node Bob. The actual delay
δB is mapped to the delay δ¯B to ensure the maximum height
of sawtooth is ’A’.
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Fig. 8: Alice predicting a phase φtest, at a predefined instance
ttest at Bob’s end using estimates T̂B, φ̂
′ , and ρ̂AB (12).
consists of noises generated from from Alice’s clock noise
while transmitting PING, wireless channel and Bob’s clock
noise in starting the delay generation subsequent to receiving
PING. Hence, cov(n) = (σ2c + 2σ
2
j )I. Similarly, the noise
vector w consists of noises from RESPOND generation and
wireless channel. Hence, cov(w) = (σ2c + σ
2
j )I.
IV. ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS BY ALICE AND BOB
Alice and Bob independently estimate parameters from the
measurements obtained from CLIMEX protocol. It is assumed
that Alice and Bob know their own frequencies fA and fB.
Alice can estimate parameters fd, φ
′
and ρAB from the mea-
surements in (4) by minimizing a cost function J(fd, φ
′
, ρAB),
{f̂d, φ̂′ , ρ̂AB} = arg min J(fd, φ′ , ρAB). (8)
The squared cost function at Alice can be given as
J(fd, φ
′
, ρAB) ,
∥∥∥∥yA|t′−h(fd, φ′ ,∆,0)−δ01− 2c ρAB1
∥∥∥∥2 .
(9)
Above cost function can be minimized while estimating opti-
mal value of ρAB,
ρ̂AB =
yA|t′ − h(fd, φ′ ,∆,0)−δ01
2/c
. (10)
Because of double modulus nonlinearity of measurement
model, we propose estimating f̂d and φ̂
′
by minimizing the
cost function as suggested in (8) by a grid search over
parameters [39], [44]. Now Alice can estimate Bob’s clock
frequency fB from her estimate of fd i.e.,
f̂B = f̂d − fA. (11)
f̂B is Bob’s clock frequency estimated by Alice. Similarly,
fA, φ
′′
, and ρAB can be estimated by Bob, mutatis mutandis.
A. Measuring the phase φtest at a predefined instance ttest
Since Alice and Bob take turns in collecting epochs, the
phase estimates of the sawtooths, φ
′
and φ
′′
will be different
for both. Phase estimates φ̂
′
and φ̂
′′
at Alice and Bob are
timestampped by t
′
and t
′′
. Using each other’s clock frequency
and phase estimate at a given time, they can estimate phases of
each other’s clocks at any given time instance. Figure 8 shows
the phase φtest at Bob’s clock which is the time measurement
between a pre-defined time instance ttest and the subsequent
clock edge of Bob’s clock. While Bob can measure φtest at
its own clock, Alice can estimate it. The pre-defined time ttest
can be provided by an external reference clock. Or can be
referenced at Bob with a specific received PING from Alice.
Thus, they can establish a common phase parameter among
them.
Estimates φ̂
′
and φ̂
′′
along with f̂A and f̂B helps Alice and
Bob in predicting phases of each other’s clock at any instance
of time. As can be seen in Fig.4b, Alice can predict a phase
φtest at a preset time ttest on Bob’s clock,
φ̂test = 2pi − 2pif̂B mod1/f̂B
(
ttest − t′ − φ̂
′
2pif̂d
− ρ̂AB
c
)
. (12)
Bob can also measure φtest on its own clock. Thus φtest can be
established as a shared parameter among them. Thus from the
7CLIMEX protocol, Alice and Bob can share parameters fA ,
fB, ρAB and φtest among them.
V. SECRECY ANALYSIS
There are many aspects of secure exchanges using the
CLIMEX protocol. Robustness to several adversary models,
non-observability of parameters to adversary, secret bit genera-
tion from various independent parameters, deliberate dithering
of measurements and robustness to active adversaries.
A. Deliberate dithering of measurements by introducing ∆
As discussed previously, random added delays ∆ to PINGS
dithers the measurements for everyone. Alice and Eve know-
ing their respective added ∆ can retrieve parameters from
measurements. This is a very novel aspect of the CLIMEX
protocol. While possible dynamic range of estimates is quan-
tified in terms of number of shared secret bits, effect of adding
∆ is not analyzed in this paper quantitatively. However, it can
be seen that arbitrary choice of ∆ can result in arbitrarily
poor estimate of parameters for an eavesdropper. For every
PING transmitted there is a ∆i associated with it. Number of
measurements in a set of measurement by Alice or Bob can
be in hundreds or thousands or even more. The distribution
of ∆ can be arbitrary and depends on the user. For a brute
force attempt by Eve to guess ∆, Eve will have to attempt
very large number of combinations of an arbitrary distribution.
Which can not even be attempted in lack of knowledge of the
distribution of ∆.
B. Eve as a passive adversary, possible measurements and
estimation
In this section different adversary models will be discussed.
The adversary models will be discussed based on CLIMEX
protocol discussed in previous sections. In this subsection,
parameter estimation capabilities of adversary from the mea-
surements made on signals received from Alice and Bob
is explored, when Alice and Bob adhere to the CLIMEX
protocol.
Figure 1 shows Eve as an eavesdropper, a passive listener,
listening to message exchange between Alice and Bob. As
shown in the figure, ρAB is the distance between Alice and
Bob, ρAE is the distance between Alice and Eve and ρBE is the
distance between Bob and Eve.
As shown in Fig.9, the third node Eve receives signals
from Alice and Bob. Eve is assumed to have at least the
same capabilities and same hardware as Alice and Bob.
Eve’s measurements are timestampped with time t
′′′
. Eve
measurements shown as [yE(1) yE(2) · · · ]> are time difference
of arrivals between receptions from Alice and Bob.
1) Eve measuring time difference of arrivals of RTT mea-
surements yE|t′ = [yE(1) · · · yE(N)]>: From Fig.9, measure-
ments at Eve’s end can be written as
yE(1) = δB + ρAB + ρBE − ρAE + nE. (13)
Where δB , the total delay at Bob’s node given by (2).
Measurements in vector form at Eve can be written as
yE = yE|t′′′ = δB + r + nE , (14)
t
Bob
Eve
Alice
Tm
yE(2)
t
′
t
′′′
t
δB
yE(1)
yA(2)yA(1)
ρAB
ρBE
ρAE
Fig. 9: Conceptual timing diagram of one-way RTT protocol
between Alice and Bob while Eve is a passive adversary. Eve
is ρAE and ρBE distances away from Alice and Bob. Eve collects
RTT measurements [yE(1) yE(2) · · · ]>.
where t
′′′
is the timestamp when Eve starts recording the
measurements. Sum of these distances, r = ρAB + ρBE − ρAE
contributes a constant term to the measurements. The distances
ρAB, ρBE and ρAE are non-observable to Eve in absence of
enough independent measurements. As is evident from (1),
(2) and (3), the vector δB contains all the information about
all the clock parameters in the RTT protocol. As shown in (9)
and (10), to estimate clock parameters Alice makes use of ∆
which is known only to her. Since ∆ is unknown to Eve hence
Eve can not estimate clock parameters when Alice and Eve
collect measurement epoch from CLIMEX protocol between
them.
However, if Alice and Bob collect RTT measurement epoch
from the RTT protocol between them as shown in Fig.4a, Eve
can estimate clock parameters from time difference of arrival
measurements. Eve can construct a new measurement vector
p¯ from the available measurements, which can be defined as,
p¯(fd, TB, φ) = yE − E(yE). Eve can further use the following
cost function,
J(fd, TB, φ) , ‖p¯(fd, TB, φ)− h(fd, TB, φ,0)‖2 . (15)
The above cost function can be minimized to estimate fd, TB
and φ. Thus parameters can be estimated under RTT protocol
but not under the CLIMEX protocol.
2) Eve measuring time difference of arrival of PINGs and
its subsequent clock edge : As can be seen in Fig.4a that
Bob can measure the time between periodic arrivals from
Alice and the next clock edge of his own clock, h(1). Same
measurement g(1) is used by Bob in CLIMEX protocol for
delay scaling while responding as proposed while discussing
(7). As discussed previously, epoch of such measurements
will result in sawtooth. From this it can be concluded that
measuring periodic time of arrival with a reference clock
would give rise to sawtooth having relative clock parameters
of the transmitting and the reference clock. Hence, Eve can
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Fig. 10: fd estimation error with varying fd. Simulated with σj = 1ns, σc = 2ns. Total duration of simulation is one second
with 104 PINGS per second. Change in fd keeping other parameters of simulation same results in aliasing phenomenon, hence
zig-zag fluctuations in simulated results.
measure time of arrival from Alice or Bob with her own clock
as a reference clock to estimate fA or fB, assuming she would
know her own clock frequency.
However, in CLIMEX protocol the corresponding measure-
ment would be g(1). As can be seen from (6), Eve would need
to know ∆ to make sense of such measurements. Hence, while
such measurements would reveal relative clock information in
RTT protocol but in CLIMEX protocol such measurements
will not be of any use to Eve in absence of knowledge of ∆.
C. Shared secret bit generation from exchanged parameters
The parameters estimated between Alice and Bob, fA, fB,
φtest and ρAB are all independent of each other. Alice and Bob
generate private keys using these estimated parameters.
1) (fA, fB): As discussed in section II, clock frequencies of
Alice and Bob (fA, fB) can lie around their nominal frequen-
cies. The deviation around the nominal frequency is usually
specified in terms of PPM of the clock. However the nominal
frequency of the clock can be variable. Large differences
in fA and fB and hence large values of |fd| will require
increased update rate (rate of sending PINGS) of the system
to sufficiently sample the sawtooth waveform. Smaller values
of |fd| would need longer measurement time. To demonstrate
number of possible secret bits from the measurements between
Alice and Bob, the experimental setup in [39] is considered
with nominal clock frequencies at Alice and Bob, f0 of
100 MHz, update rate of 104 PINGS per second and clock
deviation of 10 PPM. fA = f0 + δfA, fB = f0 + δfB. Hence,
|fd| = |δfA − δfB| and δfA, δfB ∼ U(−500, 500). However, the
accuracy of estimating f̂d would determine the quantization
of range of values of δfA and δfB. Figure10 is simulated using
above parameters. Where deviation in estimates are recorded
for values of fd. As can be seen from Fig.10, for large values
of fd, undersampling of sawtooth results in large errors. While
for very low values of fd, period of sawtooth waveform is
too large to be captured for simulation duration. The non-
monotonous, zig-zag nature of curves in simulation results
is due to the aliasing effects of waveform sampling while
changing the sawtooth frequency.
As shown in Fig.10a, a limit is set on the performance of the
estimator as E|f̂d−fd| ≤ ∆f . This sets frequency quantization
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Fig. 11: Valid combinations of δfA and δfB lie within un-
shaded regions. Considering quantization bins of 1 Hz for δfA
and δfB, total number of combinations are area under the un-
shaded region, equals 9982.
bins of size ∆f . Set of possible combinations offA andfB , T ,
constraining the performance of estimating fd can be written
as
T :={
(δfA, δfB) : E|f̂d − fd| ≤ ∆f, δfA and δfB ∈ (1, 2, ..)
}
.(16)
Cardinality of the set |T | determines number of secret bits
extracted from uncertainty in values of fA and fB. As shown
in the Fig.10a, for ∆f = 0.5 Hz, possible values of fd lies
from 2 to 1000 Hz. The number of combinations of fA and fB
pair can be computed as area under the un-shaded regions in
Fig.11, when δfA and δfB are quantized by 1 Hz bins. Area of
the un-shaded regions can be computed as sum of areas of the
two triangles in the Fig.11, which is |T | = 9982. Thus, total
number of secret bits extracted from uncertainty of (fA, fB)
combinations is Nf = log2(|T |) ∼ 20 bits.
2) φtest: As can be seen in Fig.10b, the parameter φtest can
be resolved with precision of 0.1 radian for the considered
noise and system parameters. So, the number of possible
secret bits from uncertainties in estimating φtest is, Nφ =
log2(2pi/0.1) ∼ 6 bits.
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Fig. 12: Eve trying to infiltrate the exchanges between Alice
and Bob. Eve’s response can show up as outlier in sawtooth
measurement if Eve can not estimate all the distances in the
setup besides estimating all clock parameters simultaneously.
Eve
Bob
Alice
Fig. 13: Alice and Bob are disconnected, Eve can talk to both
and tries to impersonate Bob
3) ρAB: From Fig.10c, precision of estimating distance
between Alice and Bob can be upto 2 cm. Such a precision
in range measurements can be obtained even in present day
commercial ranging devices [45]. Thus for a possible range
of 100 meters between Alice and Bob. Number of possible
uncertainties and hence number of secret bits are Nρ =
100/0.02 ∼ 12 bits.
Thus, total number of possible secret bits considering the
system and noise parameters discussed above can be
N = Nf +Nφ +Nρ ∼ 38 bits. (17)
Above analysis is simplified as the range of parameters and
their bins are chosen conservatively. However, it serves the
purpose of demonstrating the possibility of extracting secret
bits from the CLIMEX protocol.
D. Eve an active adversary
Alice and Bob can track the generated sawtooth waveforms
from RTT measurements as valid signatures. For Eve to
either impersonate or to infiltrate the exchanges without being
detected, she has to ensure that the time of arrival of her signal
at Alice or Bob should fall on the sawtooth waveform being
generated from the measurements. To achieve this, she has to
estimate all the distances, ρAB, ρBE and ρAE besides estimating
all clock parameters for Eve to transmit at the right time so to
be able to fit its response on a sawtooth produced at Alice or
Bob. Figure 12 illustrates a response called ’False Response’
from Eve attempting to infiltrate message exchange between
Alice and Bob but instead showing up as an outlier. It should
be noted that Eve has to estimate more parameters than Alice
and Bob in order to infiltrate. Additionally, as can be seen
from (14), the three distances are non-observable from the
measurements between Alice and Bob. So, Eve does not get
enough information to infiltrate or impersonate the exchanges
between Alice and Bob.
Eve as an active adversary can also try to participate in
mutual signal exchanges between Alice and Bob. Particularly
in situations when direct communication between Alice and
Bob gets blocked without them knowing it, as shown in Fig.13.
Here Eve gets an opportunity to impersonate the responding
node. In such situations, the sawtooth waveform in the mea-
surement can come again to rescue. As discussed above, Eve
will have to transmit at times with precise knowledge of all
parameters. Even the sawtooth measurement would provide
some robustness to jamming. Resistance against any timing
attack through jamming or worm-hole attack can also be
resisted while tracking the sawtooth signature in time or arrival
of signals [27]. Correlation properties of sawtooth waveform
would provide some level of resistance against jamming and
similar attacks.
E. Non-observable parameters
Clock frequencies of Alice and Bob, fA, fB are non-
observable to Eve from measurements. As can be seen from
the following arguments.
1) It is assumed that Alice and Bob know their own clock
frequencies fA and fB.
2) Alice can estimate fd (8) and Alice can also trivially
estimate Bob’s clock frequency fB = fd − fA, (11).
3) Similarly, Bob can estimate its own and Alice’s frequen-
cies.
4) It can be seen from (4), (5) and (6) that fA and fB,
individual clock frequencies of Alice and Bob are non-
observable these RTT measurements. This is true even
without using any random transmit delay ∆. It is as-
sumed that no one else knows Alice’s and Bob’s clock
frequencies. In case of Alice and Bob not revealing it
by themselves, it will require direct physical access to
Alice’s and Bob’s clock to measure their frequencies.
5) As discussed in previous sections, Alice and Bob can
estimate fA and fB. However, these frequencies are non-
observable to Eve or anyone else.
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6) Usage of ∆ for deliberate dithering of measurements
further makes it difficult for Eve to eavesdrop.
Mathematically, it should be observed from (4), (5) and (6), in
RTT measurements collected from CLIMEX protocol, fA and
fB are non-observable and can not be estimated unless fA or fB
is known. It means that Eve can not estimate these parameters
from any possible measurements when Alice and Bob follow
the CLIMEX protocol.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
The idea presented in this paper is conceived from the
testbed outcome. Clock parameters and distances are physical
parameter which can be controlled and can be setup to a good
extent based on necessity. Different parameters for generating
secret bits discussed above have different properties and rele-
vance in the scheme. While frequencies and the distance have
unknown values in the system which can be setup by the users
in the system to certain precision, the phase is usually out of
control of the users. Frequency of the clock and position of
Alice or Bob can possibly be obtained by Eve by some other
physical access or means. But instantaneous relative phase of
two clocks separated by a distance can only be obtained at
the time of operation. As discussed in previous section, the
parameter φtest amounts to nearly 6 shared secret bits in the
considered setup, it is more infeasible to be revealed to the
adversary.
In present day consumer electronic systems, range of pa-
rameters chosen in previous section to derive number of bits
can be larger. Update rate can be possibly many orders higher.
Distance estimation with sufficient accuracy is possible of
up to a kilo-meter. Clock frequency of nodes can be in
hundreds of mega-hertz. Overall, higher number of shared
secret bits is possible with aggressive selection of system
parameters. Number of shared secret bits can also be increased
by successive execution of CLIMEX protocol.
Considering scope of future work, the proposed CLIMEX
protocol can also be applied for following general application
scenarios
1) Secure ranging and secure positioning in scenarios such
as [27], [31], [46], [47].
2) Time synchronization in wireless networks can be secured
with the CLIMEX implementation between nodes. While
achieving the time synchronization at the same time in
schemes such as [48].
VII. CONCLUSION
CLIMEX as a secure wireless protocol is proposed for
establishing secret bits between Alice and Bob, based on a
round-trip-scheme where Alice and Bob sequentially set up the
information exchange in a ping-response fashion. A CLIMEX
ping by Alice is securitized by an inherent synthetic clock
edge or time-domain dithering, only known to Alice. The
subsequent response by Bob is securitized by an amplitude-
domain scaling. At Alice, a double-modulus nonlinear mea-
surement model provides means for extracting the inherent
physical parameters of both Alice and Bob, based on repeated
measurements of Bob responses, and the unique knowledge
of Alice’s own inherent physical parameters. The physical
parameters of Alice and Bob form the foundation for the
secret bits. Subsequently, for reciprocity Bob is taking Eve’s
role, and vice versa. By CLIMEX protocol, Bob is retrieving
the secret bits, mutatis mutandis. For a passive adversary
Eve with at least the same capabilities as Alice and Bob, it
is shown that the physical parameters are unobservable. In
addition, for an active impersonator Eve it is shown that its
actions are detectable at Alice and Bob, manifested as outlier
measurements. Use of IEEE 802.15.4a like impulse radio
UWB technology is considered for CLIMEX implementation.
In-house testbed based on Xilinx Virtex-5 and ACAM time-
to-digital-converters for required sub-clock resolution provided
us with supporting experimental data and design parameters,
showing potential for some 38 possible secret bits in typical
use cases. Potential of CLIMEX can be foreseen for use
cases with short to medium range distances (1-100 meters)
between the nodes, including a variety of services for wireless
communications, ranging and positioning.
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